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Abstract
This paper presents two Byzantine fault-tolerant state
machine replication (BFT) algorithms that are minimal
in several senses. First, they require only 2 f + 1 repli-
cas, instead of the usual 3 f +1. Second, the trusted ser-
vice in which this reduction of replicas is based is ar-
guably minimal: it provides an interface with a single
function and is composed only by a counter and a sig-
nature generation primitive. Third, in nice executions
the two algorithms run in the minimum number of com-
munication steps for non-speculative and speculative al-
gorithms, respectively 4 and 3 steps. The paper is also
the first to present BFT algorithms with 2 f + 1 replicas
that require a trusted service implementable using com-
mercial off-the-shelf trusted hardware: this service can
be implemented with the Trusted Platform Module cur-
rently available as a chip in the mainboard of many com-
modity PCs.
1 Introduction
The complexity and the extensibility of current com-
puter systems have been causing a plague of exploitable
software bugs and configuration mistakes. Accord-
ingly, the number of cyber-attacks has been growing
making computer security as a whole an important re-
search challenge. To meet this challenge several Byzan-
tine fault-tolerant algorithms have been proposed. The
main idea of these algorithms is to allow a system to
continue to operate correctly even if some of its com-
ponents exhibit arbitrary, possibly malicious, behavior
[5, 11, 12, 14, 16, 18, 23, 25, 28, 38, 48]. These algo-
rithms have been used to design intrusion-tolerant ser-
vices such as network file systems [11, 48], cooperative
backup [4], large scale storage [3], secure DNS [10], co-
ordination services [7], certification authorities [49] and
key management systems [39].
Byzantine fault-tolerant systems are usually built us-
ing replication techniques. The state machine approach
is a generic replication technique to implement deter-
ministic fault-tolerant services. It was first defined as a
means to tolerate crash faults [41] and later extended for
Byzantine/arbitrary faults [38, 11]. The algorithms of the
latter category are usually called simply BFT1.
Minimal number of replicas BFT algorithms typi-
cally require 3 f + 1 servers (or replicas2) to tolerate f
Byzantine (or faulty) servers [11, 16, 23, 38]. Clearly
a majority of the servers must be non-faulty, because
the idea is to do voting on the output of the servers and
faulty servers can not be reliably identified, but these al-
gorithms require f additional servers.
Reducing the number of replicas has an important
impact in the cost of intrusion-tolerant systems as one
replica is far more costly than its hardware. For tolerat-
ing attacks and intrusions, the replicas can not be identi-
cal and share the same vulnerabilities, otherwise causing
intrusions in all the replicas would be almost the same
as in a single one. Therefore, there has to be diver-
sity among the replicas, i.e., replicas shall have differ-
ent operating systems, different application software, etc
[26, 32]. This involves additional considerable costs per-
replica, in terms not only of hardware but especially of
software development, acquisition and management.
The paper presents two novel BFT algorithms that are
minimal in several senses. The first, is that they require
only 2 f + 1 replicas, which is clearly the minimum for
BFT algorithms, since a majority of the replicas must be
non-faulty.
Minimal trusted service A few years ago, some of
the authors of the paper proposed the first BFT algo-
1In the paper we use BFT to mean specifically “Byzantine fault-
tolerant state machine replication algorithms”. There are many algo-
rithms in the literature that are Byzantine fault-tolerant but that provide
weaker semantics, e.g., registers implemented with quorum systems
[29]. When we speak about BFT in the paper, we do not include those.
2We use the two words interchangeably, since servers are used ex-
clusively as replicas of the service they run.
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rithm with only 2 f + 1 replicas [14]. This algorithm re-
quires that the system is enhanced with a tamperproof
distributed component called Trusted Timely Comput-
ing Base (TTCB). The TTCB provides an ordering ser-
vice used to implement an atomic multicast protocol with
only 2 f + 1 replicas, which is the core of the replica-
tion scheme. Recently, another BFT algorithm with only
2 f +1 replicas was presented, A2M-PBFT-EA [12]. It is
based on an Attested Append-Only Memory (A2M) ab-
straction, which like the TTCB has to be tamperproof,
but that is local to the computers, not distributed. Repli-
cas utilizing A2M are forced to commit to a single,
monotonically increasing sequence of operations. Since
the sequence is externally verifiable, faulty replicas can
not present different sequences to different replicas.
These two works have shown that in order to reduce
the number of replicas from 3 f + 1 to 2 f + 1 the repli-
cas have to be extended with tamperproof components.
While 3 f +1 BFT algorithms tolerated any failure in up
to f replicas, 2 f + 1 BFT algorithms also tolerate up to
f faulty replicas, but these components can not be com-
promised. Therefore, an important aspect of the design
of 2 f + 1 BFT algorithms is the design of these compo-
nents so that they can be trusted to be tamperproof. This
problem is not novel for it is similar to the problem of
designing a Trusted Computing Base or a reference mon-
itor. A fundamental goal is to design the component in
such a way that it is verifiable, which requires that it is
simple (see for example [20]). However, the TTCB is a
distributed component that provides several services and
A2M provides a log that can grow considerably and an
interface with functions to append, lookup and truncate
messages in the log.
The second sense in which the algorithms pre-
sented in this paper are said to be minimal is that the
trusted/tamperproof service in which they are based is
simpler that the two previous in the literature and ar-
guably minimal: it provides an interface with a single
function and internally it is composed only by a counter
(only to be increased by one at a time) and a digital sig-
nature generation primitive (e.g., RSA or ESIGN).
Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the
MinPBFT and MinZyzzyva, algorithms proposed in the
paper and also presents a comparison of them with the
main BFT algorithms in the literature.
Replic. Steps Tr.Compon. Speculat.?
PBFT 3 f +1 5 no no
Zyzzyva 3 f +1 3 no yes
BFT w/TTCB 2 f +1 5 TTCB no
A2M-PBFT-EA 2 f +1 5 A2M no
MinPBFT 2 f +1 4 USIG/TPM no
MinZyzzyva 2 f +1 3 USIG/TPM yes
Table 1: Comparison of some BFT algorithms
Minimal number of steps The number of communi-
cation steps is an important metric for distributed algo-
rithms, for the delay of the communication tends to have
a major impact in the latency of the algorithm. This is
specially important in WANs, where the communication
delay can be as much as one thousand times higher than
in LANs3.
The first algorithm we propose – MinPBFT – fol-
lows a message exchange pattern similar to PBFT’s [11].
The replicas move through a succession of configura-
tions called views. Each view has a primary replica
and the others are backups. When a quorum of repli-
cas suspects that the primary replica is faulty, a new pri-
mary is chosen, allowing the system to make progress.
The fundamental idea of MinPBFT is that the primary
uses the trusted counters to assign sequence numbers to
client requests. However, more than assigning a number,
the tamperproof component produces a signed certificate
that proves unequivocally that the number is assigned to
that message (and not other) and that the counter was in-
cremented (so the same number can not be used twice).
This USIG-certificate is signed using the trusted com-
ponent private key, so it can be verified by the other
replicas using the corresponding public key. The service
is called Unrepeatable Sequential Identifier Generator
(USIG). The core of MinPBFT is a Confirmable Reliable
Multicast (CRM) primitive, which requires only 2 f + 1
servers, instead of the 3 f +1 of reliable multicast in ho-
mogeneous systems, i.e., in systems with no “special”
(tamperproof) component [8].
The second algorithm we propose – MinZyzzyva– is
based on speculation, i.e., on the tentative execution of
the clients’ requests without previous agreement on the
order of their execution. MinZyzzyva is a modified ver-
sion of Zyzzyva, the first speculative BFT algorithm [23].
For BFT algorithms, the metric considered for latency
is usually the number of communication steps in nice ex-
ecutions, i.e., when there are no failures and the system is
synchronous enough for the primary not to be changed.
MinPBFT and MinZyzzyva are minimal in terms of this
metric for in nice executions the two algorithms run in
the minimum known number of communication steps of
non-speculative and speculative algorithms, respectively
4 and 3 steps [28, 23]. Notice that the gain of one step
in speculative algorithms comes at a price: in certain sit-
uations Zyzzyva and MinZyzzyva may have to rollback
some executions, which may not be possible in some ap-
plications.
At this stage it is important to comment that there are
no free lunches and that these improvements have their
drawbacks also. For one, in relation to “classical” BFT
algorithms that do not use a trusted component, our al-
3And in fact to tolerate disasters, replicas must be stored in different
buildings or even different cities, requiring high communication delays.
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gorithms (and the other two in the literature) have the
disadvantage of having one additional point of failure:
the tamperproofness of the component. In practice, this
prevents these algorithms from being used in settings
in which the potential attacker has physical access to a
replica, as protecting even hardware components from
physical attacks is at best complicated. The second is-
sue, is that we need to use signatures based on public key
cryptography, unlike PBFT and others. This has a cost in
terms of performance, specially in LANs, in which the
communication delays are low.
COTS trusted hardware Another important aspect of
the algorithms presented in the paper is that they are
the first BFT algorithms with 2 f + 1 replicas that re-
quire only commercial off-the-shelf trusted hardware:
the trusted service they need can be implemented with
the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). The TPM was de-
signed by the Trusted Computing Group4 and is currently
available as a chip in the mainboard of many commod-
ity PCs. The TPM provides services like secure random
number generation, secure storage and digital signatures
[35]. Using COTS trusted hardware is an obvious benefit
in relation to previous algorithms, but also a challenge:
we can not define the tamperproof abstraction that better
suites our needs, but are restricted to those provided by
the TPM.
Our performance evaluation shows that the versions of
our algorithms that use the TPM have very poor perfor-
mance (unlike versions that use other implementations
of the service). We discuss how the TPM design and im-
plementations can evolve to become usable for practical
BFT algorithms.
Contributions The contributions of the paper can be
summarized as follows:
• it presents two BFT algorithms that are minimal in
terms of number of replicas (only 2 f +1), complex-
ity of the trusted service used, and number of com-
munication steps (4 and 3 respectively without/with
speculation);
• it presents the first Byzantine fault-tolerant state
machine replication algorithm with 2 f + 1 replicas
using only COTS trusted hardware currently ship-
ping in commodity PCs, also showing a novel ap-
plication for the TPM.
2 System Model
The system is composed by a set of n servers P =
{s0, ...,sn−1} that provide a Byzantine fault-tolerant ser-
4Formerly TCPA, https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/
vice to a set of clients. Clients and servers are intercon-
nected by a network and communicate only by message-
passing.
The network can drop, reorder and duplicate mes-
sages, but these faults are masked using common tech-
niques like packet retransmissions. Messages are kept
in a message log for being retransmitted. An attacker
may have access to the network and be able to mod-
ify messages, so messages contain digital signatures.
Servers and clients know the public keys they need to
check these signatures. We make the standard assump-
tions about cryptography, i.e., that hash functions are
collision-resistant and that signatures can not be forged.
Servers and clients are said to be either correct or
faulty. Correct servers/clients always follow their algo-
rithm. On the contrary, faulty servers/clients can deviate
arbitrarily from their algorithm, even by colluding with
some malicious purpose. This class of unconstrained
faults is usually called Byzantine or arbitrary. We as-
sume that at most f out of n servers can be faulty for
n = 2 f + 1. In practice this requires that the servers are
diverse [26, 32].
Notice that we are not considering the generic case —
n ≥ 2 f + 1 — but the tight case in which the number
of servers n is the minimum for a value of f , i.e., n =
2 f +1. This restriction is well-known to greatly simplify
the presentation of the algorithms, which are simple to
modify to the generic case.
Each server contains a local trusted/tamperproof com-
ponent that provides the USIG service (see next section).
Therefore, the fault model we consider is hybrid [47].
The Byzantine model states that any number of clients
and any f servers can be faulty. However, the USIG ser-
vice is tamperproof, i.e., always satisfies its specification,
even if it is in a faulty server. For instance, a faulty server
may decide not to send a message or send it corrupted,
but it can not send two different messages with the same
value of the USIG’s counter and a correct signature.
We do not make assumptions about processing or
communication delays, except that these delays do not
grow indefinitely (like PBFT [11]). This rather weak as-
sumption has to be satisfied only to ensure the liveness
of the system, not its safety.
3 USIG Service
The Unique Sequential Identifier Generator (USIG)
assigns to messages (i.e., arrays of bytes) identi-
fiers that are unique, increasing and sequential (e.g.,
562,563,564, ...). The service is implemented in a iso-
lated, tamperproof, component that we assume can not
be corrupted. This component contains essentially a
counter and a digital signature primitive. The private key
used to do the signatures is also stored in the component
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(and can not be disclosed). The corresponding public key
(PK) is made available some way to all the other servers
(and also to the clients in the case of MinZyzzyva). The
service never repeats identifiers (there is simply no inter-
face to do it) and never assigns the same identifier to two
different messages (executions of the service are sequen-
tial and each execution always increases the counter).
The interface of the service has a single function:
createUI(m) – increments the value of the counter
and produces a signature of a data structure that includes
the counter value and the hash of m. Returns a unique
identifier UI, which is a data structure containing the
counter value and the USIG-certificate that certifies that
UI was created by this component (which includes the
signature).
In the algorithms we use another function that however
is not part of the service, so it is implemented outside of
the component:
verifyUI(PK,UI,m) – verifies if the unique identi-
fier UI is valid for message m, i.e., if the USIG-certificate
matches the message and the rest of the data in UI. The
function calculates the hash of m, uses the public key PK
to check if the signature was produced from the hash of
m, and does other verifications that may be needed (see
Section 3.2). In general the USIG-certificate is only a
signature and no further verifications are needed. The
exception is when the USIG service is implemented us-
ing the TPM (see Section 3.2). The function returns true
(valid) or false.
3.1 Implementing the USIG Service
In this section we briefly survey a set of solutions that can
be used to make the USIG service tamperproof. Several
options have been discussed in papers about the TTCB
[15] and A2M [12].
The main difficulty is to isolate the service from the
rest of the system. Therefore a solution is to use vir-
tualization, i.e., a hypervisor that provides isolation be-
tween a set of virtual machines with their own operat-
ing system. Examples include Xen [6] and other more
security-related technologies like Terra [19], Nizza [42]
and Proxos [44].
AMD’s Secure Virtual Machine (SVM) architecture
[2] and Intel’s Trusted Execution Technology (TXT) [21]
are recent technologies that provide a hardware-based so-
lution to launch software in a controlled way, allowing
the enforcement of certain security properties. Flicker
explores these technologies to provide a minimal trusted
execution environment, i.e., to run a small software com-
ponent in an isolated way [31]. Flicker and similar mech-
anisms can be used to implement the USIG service.
Other solutions include using more or less complex
hardware appliances, running their own (small) ker-
nel, communicating with the servers though some well-
controlled interface, like an RS-232C or USB cable.
3.2 Implementing USIG with the TPM
As mentioned before, the simplicity of the USIG service
permits that it is implemented with the TPM, a chip cur-
rently available in many PCs. The implementation of the
service requires TPMs compliant with the Trusted Com-
puting Group (TCG) 1.2 specifications [35, 36]. We as-
sume that the TPMs are tamperproof, i.e., resistant to any
attacks. In reality TPMs are not secure against physical
attacks [27] so we assume an attacker never has physi-
cal access to the servers and their TPMs (attacks come
through the network, e.g., from the Internet). TPMs have
the ability to sign data using the private key of the attes-
tation identity key pair (AIK), which we call private AIK
for simplicity and that can never leave the TPM (there
is no API that allows extracting it from the TPM). We
assume that servers know the other TPMs’ AIK public
keys so they can verify the signatures produced.
We explore mainly two features defined in the TPM
1.2 specification [35]. The first are the monotonic coun-
ters. The TPM provides two commands on counters:
TPM_ReadCounter that returns the counter value, and
TPM_IncrementCounter that increments the counter
and returns its new value [36]. No command is provided
to set or decrement counters. The TCG imposes that the
counters have 32 bits and can not be increased arbitrar-
ily often to prevent that they burn out in 7 years [35]. In
the TPMs we used in the experiments, counters could not
be increased more than once every 3.5 seconds approx-
imately (and the same is verified in other TPMs [40]).
This feature seriously constrain the performance of algo-
rithms that use this implementation of the USIG service,
so later we discuss how this might be improved.
The second feature is the transport command suite
[35]. This set of commands protects the communica-
tion with the TPM as a process that wants to use the
TPM services may not trust software that may interpose
between the two. More precisely, using the commands
TPM_EstablishTransport, TPM_ExecuteTransport
and TPM_ReleaseTransportSigned, it is possible to
create a session that is used to do a sequence of TPM
commands, to log all executed commands, and to obtain
a hash of this log along with a digital signature of this
same hash obtained with the private AIK [36, 22]. The
communication between the process and the TPM is pro-
tected using common mechanisms like message authenti-
cation codes (MACs) produced with hash functions and
nonces. From the point of view of our algorithms, the
important is that the TPM_ReleaseTransportSigned
command returns a proof that a set of commands was ex-
ecuted by the TPM. This proof can be verified by holders
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of the public AIK.
The USIG service interface (function createUI) does
not change in the TPM-based implementation. How-
ever, the service is not completely implemented inside
the TPM, which can not be modified, but by the TPM
plus a thin software layer on top of it. This layer does
not have to be trusted.
The implementation of the USIG service on top of the
TPM is straightforward. The function createUI(m) is
implemented the following way:
1. calculates a hash of m;
2. starts a session in the TPM by calling TPM_Establish
Transport and TPM_ExecuteTransport;
3. asks the TPM to increment the counter by calling
TPM_IncrementCounter, assuring that all messages are
assigned a sequential number (concurrency is not an is-
sue as no two sessions can be open simultaneously in the
same TPM);
4. ends the session by calling TPM_ReleaseTransport
Signed, which takes as parameter the hash of the mes-
sage (antiReplay parameter), and produces a signature of
a data structure that includes the monotonic counter value,
the hash of m and the hash of the transport session log;
5. returns a data structure with all those items plus the sig-
nature that is what we call the unique identifier UI.
Notice that the USIG-certificate we mentioned when
first describing the createUI is now composed by the
signature and the hash of the transport session log. The
latter is used to prove that the TPM increased the counter.
Therefore, we do not have a tamperproof service that al-
ways increment the counter, but a non-tamperproof layer
of software that requests the tamperproof hardware to in-
crement the counter and give a proof that it did it.
The function verifyUI, which as we mentioned be-
fore is implemented in software, outside the tamperproof
component, is implemented as follows:
verifyUI(PK,UI,m) – The function calculates the
hash of m and checks if this hash is equal to the hash
in UI. Then, it uses the TPM’s public AIK (PK) to
check if the signature was produced from the hash of
m together with the hash of the transport log and the
hash of the monotonic counter, both part of the UI.
Finnally, it checks if the log contains the call to the
TPM_IncrementCounter command. If some of these
checks fail, the function returns false, otherwise it returns
true.
4 Confirmable Reliable Multicast
One of the problems that any BFT algorithm has to
solve is the problem of forcing all the replicas to de-
liver the same messages. This is known as the reliable
multicast problem and has been shown to require 3 f +1
servers/processes to be solvable in asynchronous systems
with an homogenous Byzantine fault model [8]. In this
section we present the Confirmable Reliable Multicast
(CRM) algorithm, which uses the USIG service to solve
reliable multicast with only 2 f + 1 servers/processes.
Additionally, CRM allows a replica that accepts a mes-
sage m to prove that it did accept m following the algo-
rithm. We start by presenting CRM because it is in the
core of MinPBFT.
Normally reliable multicast is defined considering that
the algorithm is executed by a set of processes, but here
we use instead the word servers to let clear that the CRM
algorithm is executed only by the servers of the BFT al-
gorithm, never by the clients. CRM is defined in terms
of the following properties (for a data message m that is
multicasted):
• Validity: If a correct server multicasts a message m,
then some correct server eventually accepts m.
• Agreement: if a correct server accepts a message m,
then all correct servers eventually accept m.
• Integrity: For any unique identifier UI, every cor-
rect server accepts at most one message m with UI,
and if sender(m) is correct then m was previously
multicast by sender(m).5
• Confirmability: If a correct server accepts a mes-
sage m, then it can prove that it accepted m follow-
ing the CRM algorithm.
Algorithm CRM is presented in Algorithm 1. The
messages are called PREPARE and COMMIT as this is
the role they play in the MinPBFT algorithm (next sec-
tion). They also include a view number v that is used
in MinPBFT but has no purpose in the reliable multicast
algorithm.
The basic idea is that a data message m is sent in a
PREPARE message to all servers (line 3), and each server
resends it to all others in a COMMIT message (line 7) 6.
Each message sent has a unique identifier UI generated
by the createUI function (lines 2, 6,10), so no two mes-
sages can have the same identifier. Servers check if the
identifier of the messages they receive are valid for the
messages using the verifyUI function (lines 5).
If a server did not receive a PREPARE message but it
received a COMMIT message with a valid identifier gen-
erated by the sender (lines 8-11) then it sends its COM-
MIT message. This can happen if the sender is faulty
5sender(m) returns the sender field in the PREPARE message that is
used to disseminate m.
6For simplicity in the algorithms some messages are said to be sent
to “all servers”, which includes the sender. However, in practice this
can be implemented in a more economic way, starting by not really
sending messages to oneself.
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Algorithm 1 Confirmable Reliable Multicast
1: when si wants to multicast a data message m do
2: UIi = createUI(m)
3: send 〈PREPARE,v,si,m,UIi〉 to all servers
4: when s j receives a 〈PREPARE,v,si,m,UIi〉 from si do
5: if verifyUI(PKi,UIi,m) then
6: UIj = createUI(m)
7: send 〈COMMIT,v,s j,si,m,UIi,UIj〉 to all servers
8: when sk receives 〈COMMIT,v,s j,si,m,UIi,UIj〉 do
9: if sk did not receive the PREPARE message and
verifyUI(PKi,UIi,m) and verifyUI(PK j,UIj,m) then
10: UIk = createUI(m)
11: send 〈COMMIT,v,sk,si,m,UIi,UIk〉 to all servers
12: when sl receives 〈COMMIT,v,s j,si,m,UIi,UIj〉messages from f +
1 different servers for which verifyUI(PK j,UIj,m) do
13: accept m
and does not send the PREPARE message to server sk (but
sends it to other servers), or if the PREPARE message is
simply late and is received after the COMMIT messages.
A data message m is accepted by a server following the
algorithm if the server receives f +1 valid COMMIT mes-
sages from different servers for m (lines 12, 13).
CRM produces a certificate that a message has been
accepted. This CRM-certificate is composed by the mes-
sage m and the f +1 UI identifiers used in line 12.
Correctness A proof that the algorithm satisfies the
four properties above is provided in the Appendix A, but
the rationale is the following.
There are 2 f +1 servers so at least f +1 are correct (at
most f are faulty). If a correct server multicasts a mes-
sage m, then at least f other correct servers receive it and
reply with COMMIT messages, thus all correct servers re-
ceive f + 1 COMMIT messages and accept m (Validity).
No different message can be accepted due to the unique
identifier mechanism (Agreement/Integrity). A correct
server can prove that it accepted message m by providing
the CRM-certificate (Confirmability).
5 MinPBFT
This section presents MinPBFT, the non-speculative
2 f +1 BFT algorithm. The state machine approach con-
sists of replicating a service in a group of servers. Each
server maintains a set of state variables, which are mod-
ified by a set of operations. These operations have to be
atomic (they can not interfere with other operations) and
deterministic (the same operation executed in the same
initial state generates the same final state), and the initial
state must be the same in all servers. All servers follow
the same sequence of states if two properties are satis-
fied:
• Agreement: all servers execute the same operations.
• Total order: all servers execute the same operations
in the same order.
These are precisely the safety properties that BFT al-
gorithm has to enforce (it also has to make progress).
MinPBFT follows a message exchange pattern similar
to PBFT, which in turn is similar to Lamport’s Paxos al-
gorithm [24] (see Figure 1). The servers/replicas move
through successive configurations called views. Each
view has a primary replica and the rest are backups. The
primary is the server sp , v mod n, where v is the current
view number. Clients issue requests with operations.
In normal case operation the sequence of events is the
following: (1) A client sends a request to all servers;
(2) The primary assigns a sequence number (execution
order number) to the request and sends it to all servers
using CRM; (3) Each server executes the operation and
returns a reply to the client; (4) the client waits for f +1
matching responses of the issued operation from differ-
ent servers.
When at least f + 1 backups suspect that the primary
is faulty, a view change operation is executed, and a new
server s′p , v′ mod n becomes the primary (v′ > v is the
new view number). This mechanism provides liveness by
allowing the system to make progress when the primary
fails.
Clients A client c requests the execution of an oper-
ation op by sending a message 〈REQUEST,c,seq,op〉σc
to all servers. seq is the request identifier that is used
to ensure exactly-once semantics: (1) the servers store
in a vector Vreq the seq of the last request they executed
for each client; (2) the servers discard requests with seq
lower than the last executed (to avoid executing the same
request twice), and any requests received while the pre-
vious one is being processed. Requests are signed with
the private key of the client. Requests with an invalid sig-
nature σc are simply discarded. After sending a request,
the client waits for f +1 replies 〈REPLY,s,seq,res〉 from
different servers s with matching results res, which en-
sures that at least one reply comes from a correct server.
If the client does not receive enough replies during a time
interval read in its local clock, it resends the request. In
case the request has already been processed, the servers
resend the reply.
Servers: normal case operation The core of the al-
gorithm executed by the servers is the CRM algorithm.
When the primary receives a client request, it uses the
CRM primitive to multicast the request to all servers (m
in Algorithm 1 is the client request). The main role of the
primary is to assign a sequence number to each request.
This number is the counter value returned by the USIG
service in the unique identifier UI. These numbers are se-


















Figure 1: PBFT and MinPBFT normal case operation.
there is a view change, an issue that we discuss later.
Unlike PBFT, MinPBFT has only two steps: PREPARE
and COMMIT, which are the steps of the CRM algo-
rithm presented above. The CRM algorithm executed in
MinPBFT has a slight modification in relation to what is
presented in Section 4. The verification in line 5 evalu-
ates to true on replica s j iff two additional conditions are
also satisfied:
• the PREPARE message contains a view number v
that corresponds to the current view on s j and its
sender is the primary of v;
• the request of the client contains a valid signature
produced by that client (to prevent a faulty primary
from forging requests).
There is a second modification to CRM. Consider that
a primary server multicasts two messages m and m′ with
two counter values cv and cv′ stored in the corresponding
UI and UI′, with cv < cv′. To prevent a faulty primary
from creating “holes” in the sequence of messages, no
correct backup server sends the COMMIT for message m′
without first accepting m. This ensures that not only the
requests are executed in the order defined by the counter
of the primary, but they are also accepted in that same
order (in normal case operation). In fact, whenever CRM
accepts a request, it is executed immediately7. The only
exception is that if the server is faulty it can “order” the
same request twice. So, when a server accepts a request,
it first checks in Vreq if the request was already executed
and executes it only if not.
This message ordering mechanism imposes a FIFO or-
dering and is also enforced to other messages (in the view
change operation) that also take a unique identifier UI:
• FIFO order: no correct server processes a message
〈...,si, ...,UIi, ...〉 sent by any server si with counter
7Unlike previous BFT algorithms in the literature, in which the mes-
sages can be accepted to be executed in an order different from the one
in which they will be executed. They can only be executed after all
previous are.
value cv in UIi before it has processed message
〈...,si, ...UIi′, ...〉 sent by si with counter value cv−1
To enforce this property, each server keeps a vector
Vacc with the highest counter value cv it received from
each of the other servers.
Messages sent by a server are kept in a message log in
case they have to be resent. To discard messages from
this logs, MinPBFT uses a garbage collection mecha-
nism based on checkpoints, very similar to PBFT’s. The
main difference is only that MinPBFT does not need
high/low water marks as the FIFO order imposed with
the USIG service constrains the ability of generating fu-
ture/past sequence numbers.
Optimizations The basic algorithm presented multi-
casts each request using CRM. Like PBFT and other BFT
algorithms in the literature, the cost of this operation can
be greatly reduced by batching several requests in a sin-
gle CRM. There can be several policies for how to batch
requests. In a LAN the execution of createUI is proba-
bly the bottleneck of the algorithm, so while the primary
is executing this function it can go on batching requests
that will be sent together in the next CRM.
Another optimization that can have a considerable im-
pact in the performance of the algorithm is not send-
ing the complete requests in the COMMIT messages, but
sending only their hash. This requires two other modifi-
cations to CRM. First, no correct server sends a COMMIT
message before receiving the complete request (the client
and/or the primary can be faulty and not send the request
to a backup). Second, if a server accepts a request be-
fore receiving it, it has to get the request from one of
the servers (at least one correct server must have it or it
would not be accepted).
The communication between clients and servers is
signed with digital signatures. The replies from servers
to the clients can be signed in a faster way with MACs











Figure 2: MinPBFT view change.
Servers: view change operation In normal case op-
eration, the primary assigns sequence numbers to the
requests it receives and multicasts these numbers to
the backups using the CRM algorithm. This algorithm
strongly constrains what a faulty primary can do: it can
not repeat sequence numbers or assign arbitrarily higher
sequence numbers. However, a faulty primary can still
prevent progress by not assigning sequence numbers to
some requests (or even all).
When the primary is faulty a view change has to be
done and a new primary chosen. View changes are trig-
gered by timeout. When a backup receives a request, it
starts a timer that expires after Texec. When the request
starts being executed, the timer is stopped. If the timer
expires, the backup suspects that the primary is faulty
and starts a view change.
A time diagram of the view change operation is de-
picted in Figure 2. When a timer in backup si times-out,
si sends a message 〈REQ-VIEW-CHANGE,si,v,v′〉 to all
servers, where v is the current view number and v′= v+1
the new view number8. When a server si receives f + 1
REQ-VIEW-CHANGE messages, it moves to view v + 1
and multicasts 〈VIEW-CHANGE,si,v′,Clast ,UIi〉, where
Clast is the CRM-certificate for the last request accepted.
The message takes a unique identifier UIi obtained
by calling createUI. The objective is to prevent faulty
servers from sending different VIEW-CHANGE messages
with different Clast to different subsets of the servers,
leading to different decisions on which was the last re-
quest of the previous view. Faulty processes still can do
it, but they have to assign different UI identifiers to these
different messages, which will be processed in order by
the correct servers, so all will take the same decision on
the last request of the previous view. Correct servers only
count 〈VIEW-CHANGE,si,v′,Clast ,UIi〉 messages with a
CRM-certificate Clast that is consistent with the system
state: (1) that is valid (contains f + 1 valid UI identi-
fiers); and (2) that contains a UI′ with a counter value
cv′ = cv−1, where cv is the counter value in UIi.
When the new primary for view v + 1 receives f +
1 VIEW-CHANGE messages from different servers, it
stores them in a set Vvc and multicasts a message 〈NEW-
VIEW,si,v′,Vvc,UIi〉. Then, it uses the information Clast
8It seems superfluous to send v and v′ = v+1 but in some cases the
next view can be for instance v′ = v+2.
fields of the VIEW-CHANGE messages to define which
were the clients’ requests already received that were not
accepted/executed, and multicasts these requests in one
or more CRMs.
In previous BFT algorithms, messages are assigned se-
quential execution order numbers even when there are
view changes. This is not the case in MinPBFT as the se-
quence numbers are provided by a different tamperproof
component (or USIG service) for each view. Therefore,
when there is a view change the first sequence number
for the new view has to be defined: it is the counter value
in the unique identifier UIi in the NEW-VIEW message
plus one. The next PREPARE message sent by the new
primary must follow the UIi in the NEW-VIEW message.
When a server sends a VIEW-CHANGE message, it
starts a timer that expires after Tvc units of time. If the
timer expires before the server receives a valid NEW-
VIEW message, it starts another view change for view
v+2 9. If additional view changes are needed, the timer
is multiplied by two each time, increasing exponentially
until a new primary server respond. The objective is to
avoid timer expirations forever due to long communica-
tion delays.
Consider two quorums (i.e., subsets) of servers, one
that accepted the last executed request, and another that
is executing the view change operation (the rest of the
servers are slow). PBFT reasons in terms of quorums of
2 f + 1 servers, while MinPBFT uses quorums of f + 1
servers. In contrast with PBFT, that requires at least one
correct server in the intersection of the two quorums, in
MinPBFT we do not have this requirement. The reason is
that the Confirmability property of the CRM algorithms
and the FIFO order prevent faulty servers in the intersec-
tion of lying about the last request accepted.
A proof of the correctness of the algorithm can be
found in Appendix B.
6 MinZyzzyva
This section presents the second BFT algorithm of the
paper, MinZyzzyva. This algorithm has characteristics
similar to the previous one, but needs one communica-
tion step less in nice executions because it is speculative.
MinZyzzyva is a modified version of Zyzzyva, the first
speculative BFT algorithm [23], so it also serves to show
that the USIG service can be used with other BFT algo-
rithms to reduce the number of replicas.
The idea of speculation is that servers respond to
clients’ requests without first agreeing on the order in
which the requests are executed. They optimistically
adopt the order proposed by the primary server, execute














(b) Faulty replica case
Figure 3: MinZyzzyva basic operation.
the request, and respond immediately to the client. This
execution is speculative because that may not be the real
order in which the request should be executed. If some
servers become inconsistent with the others, clients de-
tect these inconsistencies and help correct servers con-
verge on a single total order of requests, possibly having
to rollback some of the executions. Clients only rely on
responses that are consistent with this total order.
MinZyzzyva uses the USIG service to constrain the
behavior of the primary, allowing a reduction of the num-
ber of replicas of Zyzzyva from 3 f +1 to 2 f +1, preserv-
ing the same safety and liveness properties. We divide
the presentation of MinZyzzyva in three parts: gracious
execution, faulty server case and view change. Figure 3
ilustrastes the basic operation of MinZyzzyva.
Gracious execution This is the optimistic mode of the
algorithm. It works essentially as follows: (1) A client
sends a request to the primary sp; (2) The primary re-
ceives the request, calls createUI to assign it a unique
identifier UIp containing the sequence number (just like
in MinPBFT), and forwards the request and UIp to the
other servers; (3) Servers receive the request, verify if
UIp is valid and if it comes in FIFO order, assign an-
other unique identifier UIs to the request, speculatively
execute it, and send the response to the client (with the
two UI identifiers); (4) The client gathers the replies and
only accepts messages with valid UIp and UIs; (5) If the
client receives 2 f + 1 matching responses, it completes
the request and delivers the response to the application.
Notice that 2 f + 1 are all the servers; this is a require-
ment for MinZyzzyva (as Zyzzyva) to do gracious ex-
ecution. Clients use request identifiers (seq) to ensure
exactly-once semantics, just like in MinPBFT.
Faulty server case If the network is slow or one or
more servers are faulty, the client may never receive
matching responses from all 2 f + 1 servers. When a
client sends a request it sets a timer. If this timer ex-
pires and it has received between f +1 and 2 f matching
responses, then it sends a COMMIT message containing a
COMMIT-certificate with these responses (with UIp and
the UIs identifiers) to all servers. When a correct server
receives a valid COMMIT-certificate from a client, it ac-
knowledges with a LOCAL-COMMIT message. The client
and servers store in a vector Vacc the highest received
counter value of the other servers (that come in the UI
identifiers). With the UIp and UIs in the COMMIT mes-
sage, the servers update their vector values. The client
resends the COMMIT message until it receives the corre-
sponding LOCAL-COMMIT messages from f +1 servers.
After that, the client considers the request completed and
delivers the reply to the application. The system guaran-
tees that even if there is a view change, all correct servers
execute the request at this point.
If the client receives less than f + 1 matching re-
sponses then it sets a second timer and resends the re-
quest to all servers. If a correct server receives a request
that it has executed, it resends the cached response to the
client. Otherwise, it sends the request to the primary and
starts a timer. If the primary replies before the timeout,
the server executes the request. If the timer expires be-
fore the primary sends a reply, the server initiates a view
change.
Using the unique identifier generator service, it is not
possible to generate the same identifier for two differ-
ent messages. A faulty primary can try to cause the re-
execution of some requests by assigning them two dif-
ferent UIp identifiers. However the servers detect this
misbehavior using the clients’ seq identifier in the re-
quest and do not do the second execution, just like in
MinPBFT10
View change The view change operation works essen-
tially as MinPBFT’s. When a server suspects that the pri-
mary is faulty it sends a REQ-VIEW-CHANGE message.
When a server receives f +1 REQ-VIEW-CHANGE mes-
sages, it multicasts a VIEW-CHANGE message. The new
primary sends a NEW-VIEW message. Messages are pro-
cessed in FIFO order like in MinPBFT.
A server constructs a checkpoint every Tcp containing
UIp and UIs identifiers. A server considers the check-
10Therefore Zyzzyva’s proof of misbehavior is not needed in
MinZyzzyva.
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point stable when it receives matching checkpoint mes-
sages from f + 1 different servers. Then all messages
executed before a given UIp are removed from the log.
A proof of the correctness of the algorithm can be
found in Appendix C.
7 Implementation
We implemented a single prototype, configurable to run
as MinPBFT or MinZyzzyva, with one of three imple-
mentations of the USIG service: TPM-based, virtual ma-
chine based and as a user-level process. The objective
was to compare the performance of several ways of im-
plementing the USIG service, but the main motivation is
that the current versions of the TPM provide poor perfor-
mance for two reasons:
1. the TCG’s design option of not permitting the
monotonic counters to be incremented arbitrarily
often to prevent burn out [35] (once every 3.5 sec-
onds in our TPMs and approximately the same in
others [40]);
2. the implementation of the digital signature algo-
rithm in current TPM chips is very slow.
We believe both limitations will be solved in the fu-

















Figure 4: Implementation solutions.
The three different implementations of the USIG ser-
vice are presented in Figure 4. In all versions the fun-
damental idea is to isolate the service from the rest of
the system (but the levels of isolation obtained are differ-
ent). In all versions the service has the interface and se-
mantics presented in Section 3. A simple authentication
mechanism is used to prevent processes other than the
algorithms from accessing the service. We assume it is
not possible to tamper with the service, e.g., decrement-
ing the counter, but privileged software like the operating
system might call the function createUI. In that case
the server is faulty but the algorithms are not affected (as
long as no more than f servers are faulty, which is a basic
assumption of any BFT algorithm).
The TPM-MinPBFT and TPM-MinZyzzyva versions
(Figure 4 (a)) use the USIG service based on the TPM.
In these versions the USIG service is implemented by a
thin layer of software (a function in a library) and by the
TPM itself (see Section 3.2). The identifier generated by
the service is signed using the TPM’s private AIK, a RSA
key with 2048-bits. We used TPM/J, an object-oriented
API written in Java, to do low-level access to the TPM
[40].
The VM-MinPBFT and VM-MinZyzzyva versions
(Figure 4 (b)) run the USIG service as a process in a vir-
tual machine (VM) different from the one in which the
normal system (operating system, algorithm code) runs,
and that we assume can not be corrupted. We use the Xen
hypervisor [6] to implement these versions. Xen allows
multiple applications to run in different virtual machines.
Each virtual machine runs in its own protection domain,
providing strong isolation between virtual machines. The
algorithms are executed in a virtual machine called do-
main1 and might coexist with other applications. The
USIG service runs in the domain0.
The UP-MinPBFT and UP-MinZyzzyva versions
(Figure 4 (c)) use the USIG service implemented as a
trusted user-level process. This approach takes advan-
tage of the isolation provided by the operating system,
but is not resilient against a corrupted operating system
or an attacker with superuser privileges. The USIG is
a program that runs as a separated process in the same
server.
The prototype was implemented in Java because the
level of protection of a program in Java is typically
higher than a program in C, due to Java’s features like the
language being strongly typed and the access control pro-
vided by the sandbox implemented by the JVM. The ver-
sions based on virtual machines and user-level processes,
use NTT ESIGN with 2048-bit keys for doing signatures,
instead of RSA, because the performance of ESIGN is
much better. We used the NTT ESIGN C++ implementa-
tion provided in the Crypto++ library, accessed with the
Java Native Interface. In both implementations the com-
munication between the USIG service and the algorithm
software is done using sockets. These versions are able
to continue to work correctly even under attacks com-
ing from the network against the server software. How-
ever only the versions with the TPM are tolerant to a
malicious administrator that can manipulate all services
hosted by f servers, and even those ones are not tolerant
against physical attacks.
PBFT is often considered to be the baseline of BFT
algorithms, so we were interested in comparing our
algorithms with it. However, for this comparison to
make sense we did not use the original implementa-
tion, written in C, but made our own implementation
of PBFT’s normal case operation in Java. In fact, we
have a single software prototype that can be configured
to run as PBFT, and or any versions of MinPBFT and
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MinZyzzyva. PBFT does not use signatures but authen-
ticators based on MACs.
8 Performance Evaluation
This section presents performance results of our algo-
rithms using micro and macro-benchmarks. The micro-
benchmark was used to measure the latency and through-
put of the MinPBFT and MinZyzzyva implementations
using operations that do nothing (null operations). The
macro-benchmark was used to understand the impact of
using our algorithms in a real application. We integrated
MinPBFT and MinZyzzyva with the Java Network File
System (JNFS) [37].
Unless where noted, we considered at most one faulty
server ( f = 1), requiring n = 4 servers for PBFT and n =
3 servers for MinPBFT and MinZyzzyva, and one client.
The servers and clients were Dell Optiplex 745 2.8GHz
Pentium 4 PCs with 2GB RAM and were connected
over a Fast Ethernet at 100Mbps. The PCs had a Atmel
TPM 1.2 chip. All experiments were done with Java’s
Just-In-Time (JIT) compiler enabled, and run a warm-up
phase to transform the bytecodes into native code. All
experiments run only in normal case operation (PBFT,
MinPBFT) and gracious execution (MinZyzzyva).
8.1 Micro-Benchmark
The first part of the micro-benchmark was used to
evaluate the performance of all 7 algorithms/versions:
TPM-MinPBFT, TPM-MinZyzzyva, VM-MinPBFT,
VM-MinZyzzyva, UP-MinPBFT, UP-MinZyzzyva and
PBFT. We measured the latency of the algorithms
using a simple service with no state, that executes null
operations, with arguments and results with 0 bytes.
The latency was measured at the client by reading the
local clock immediately before the request was sent, then
immediately after the response was accepted11, and sub-
tracting the former from the latter. Each request was
executed synchronously, i.e., it waited for a reply be-
fore invoking a new operation. In the case of the TPM-
based implementations, the requests were issued approx-
imately once every 4 seconds to avoid the delay of wait-
ing for the TPM monotonic counter to be incremented.
The results were obtained by timing 10,000 requests in
two executions. The values presented are averages of
these two executions.
The measurements are presented in Figure 5. The bars
for the TPM-based versions are broken due to the dif-
ference of time scale: the time taken by the TPM-based
USIG service to run createUI is 797ms, almost all of
11Involving receiving f + 1 matching responses in PBFT and
MinPBFT, and 2 f +1 in MinZyzzyva.
which are taken by the TPM to increment the counter
and produce an RSA signature. Counters implemented
in software and signatures done with ESIGN take much
less time (less than 2ms).
In the experiments, PBFT has shown the best perfor-
mance of all algorithms/implementations, followed by
the MinZyzzyva implementations and the MinPBFT ver-
sions, which were the worse. Zyzzyva is known to be
faster than PBFT in most cases [23, 43], but Zyzzyva
(like PBFT) uses only MACs, while MinZyzzyva uses
signatures, so MinZyzzyva ends up being slower than
PBFT. Notice that MinZyzzyva did only gracious exe-
cutions in the experiments; the performance is expected
to be become worse than MinPBFT if that is not the
case. The VM-based versions had slightly higher laten-
cies than the user-level versions, which was expected as
the hypervisor creates some overhead and the commu-
nication delay between VMs is higher than the commu-
nication delay between user-level processes in the same
operating system.
Figure 5: Micro-benchmark latency results for all ver-
sions (null operations, empty messages).
The second part of the micro-benchmark was used to
evaluate the latency of the versions that do not use the
TPM with different message sizes. The results are in Fig-
ure 6. The measurements were made like in the previous
set of experiments, except that the arguments and results
of the requests varied between 0 and 4000 bytes. The
measurements show that the relation between the laten-
cies of algorithms/versions is not affected by the size of
the messages, and that the latency becomes higher with
larger requests or responses, as expected.
The third part of the micro-benchmark had the ob-
jective of measuring the throughput of the algorithms.
We ran experiments using requests and responses with
0 bytes. The client processes where evenly distributed
over 2 client machines following the same test pattern
used for PBFT [11]. The values reported in Figure 7
were obtained by measuring in the servers the number
of client requests executed per second. The values are
the mean of two independent executions with 10,000 re-
quests. The throughputs of MinPBFT and MinZyzzyva
are about 2 times lower than PBFT due to the overhead
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Figure 6: Micro-benchmark latency results varying request and response sizes (in Kbytes) for versions without TPM.
of obtaining the unique identifiers with digital signatures.
All messages exchanged by these algorithms are signed
using ESIGN. Signature creation and verification for 20
bytes of data (a SHA-1 hash) take on average 1.4ms and
0.88ms, respectively. Creation and verification of MACs






























Figure 7: Throughput varying the number of clients (null
operations, 0-byte requests/responses).
In the micro-benchmark the algorithms did not use
batching. The throughputs would probably be closer
of the ones already published (e.g., [43]) if this mech-
anism was used12. Nevertheless, our experiments pro-
vided results aligned to those obtained for A2M-PBFT-
EA [12], which uses a trusted component, and also
with DEPSPACE [7], which uses a BFT algorithm im-
plemented in Java.
8.2 TPM Performance Considerations
As described in Section 7, there are two reasons for the
poor performance of our TPM-based prototypes. In this
section we discuss these reasons and how they can be
overcomed in future TPM implementations.
The first reason is the maximum increment rate of the
TPM monotonic counter (one increment by 3.5 seconds).
Due to this reason the throughput of these versions is
approximately one message by 3.5 seconds, as the bot-
tleneck is the increment of the TPM counter. However,
the use of the batching mechanisms would make a huge
12We do not provide a study of the impact of the batching mechanism
as a few have already been made [11, 43].
improvement of this throughput, as all pending requests
would be assigned a sequence number (UI) every 3.5 sec-
onds (which is still bad).
The TPM specification version 1.2 defines that the
monotonic counter “must allow for 7 years of increments
every 5 seconds” and “must support an increment rate of
once every 5 seconds” [35]. The text is not particularly
clear so the implementers of the TPM seem to have con-
cluded that the counter must not be implemented faster
than once every 5 seconds approximately, while the ob-
jective was to prevent the counter from burning out in
less than 7 years. The counter value has 32 bits, so
it might be incremented once every 52ms still attaining
this 7-year objective13. This would allow much better
throughput and latency. Furthermore, if in a future TPM
version the counter size is increased to 64 bits, it be-
comes possible to increment a counter every 12 picosec-
onds, which will make this limitation disappear.
The second reason for the poor perfomance we ob-
served is the time the TPM takes to do a signature (ap-
proximately 700ms). A first comment is that normally
cryptographic algorithms are implemented in hardware
to be faster, not slower, but our experiments have shown
that with the TPM the opposite is true. This suggests that
the performance of the TPM signatures might be much
improved. We believe that it will be indeed improved
with the development of new applications for the TPM.
Currently there are already some applications [34], but
their use seems to be far from being much spread. More-
over, at least Intel is much interested in developing the
TPM hardware. For instance, it recently announced that
it will integrate the TPM directly into its next generation
chipset [9]. Other have also been pushing for faster TPM
cryptography [30].
If these changes are implemented, the TPM perfor-
mance will be improved and its functionality can be used
to implement minimal BFT algorithms.
137 years divided by 232 = 51.4ms.
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8.3 Macro-Benchmark
To explore the costs of the algorithms in a real appli-
cation, we integrated them with JNFS, an open source
implementation of NFS that runs on top of a native file
system [37]. We compare the latencies obtained with
a single server running plain JNFS and with three dif-
ferent replication scenarios: JNFS integrated with our
PBFT implementation, JNFS with VM-MinPBFT and
JNFS with VM-MinZyzzyva.
The macro-benchmark workload consists of five
phases: (1) create/delete 6 subdirectories recursively; (2)
copy/remove a source tree containing 7 files with up
4Kb; (3) examine the status of all files in the tree with-
out examining their data (returning information as owner,
size, date of creation); (4) examine every byte of data in
a file with 4Kb size; (5) create a 4Kb file.
Table 2 shows the results of the macro-benchmark ex-
ecution. The values are the mean of the latencies of 200
runs for each phase of the workload in two independent
executions. The standard deviations for the total time
to run the benchmark with MinPBFT and MinZyzzyva
were always below 0.4% of the value reported. Note
that the overhead caused by the replication algorithms is
uniform across the benchmark phases in all algorithms.
The total time of an operation in a replication scenario
is defined by the operation time observed in JNFS in a
single server plus the algorithm latency. The main con-
clusion of the macro-benchmark was that the overhead
introduced by the replication is not too high (from 10%
to 50%).
Phase JNFS PBFT VM-MinPBFT VM-2fZyzzyva
1 26 29 34 32
2 681 686 699 689
3 20 23 30 26
4 5 7 14 11
5 108 111 118 114
Total 840 856 895 872
Table 2: Macro-benchmark: latencies of JNFS alone and
replicated with BFT algorithms (milliseconds)
9 Related Work
The idea of tolerating intrusions (or arbitrary/Byzantine
faults) in a subset of servers appeared in seminal works
by Pease et al. [33] and Fraga and Powell [18]. However,
the concept started raising more interest much later with
works such as Rampart [38] and PBFT [11].
Most work in the area uses a homogeneous fault
model, in which all components can fail in the same way,
although bounds on the number of faulty components are
established (e.g., less than a third of the replicas). With
this fault model and an asynchronous time model it has
been shown that it is not possible to do Byzantine fault-
tolerant state machine replication with less than 3 f + 1
replicas [45].
The idea of exploring a hybrid fault model in the con-
text of intrusion tolerance or Byzantine fault tolerance,
was first explored in the MAFTIA project with the TTCB
work [15, 13]. The idea was to extend the “normal”
replicas that might be faulty with a tamperproof subsys-
tem. This concept was later generalized with the notion
of wormholes [47].
It was in this context that the first 2 f +1 state machine
replication solution appeared [14]. The TTCB had the
job of ordering the clients’ requests. The atomic mul-
ticast algorithm did not follow a Paxos-like pattern, but
made destination agreement, i.e., consensus on the order
of execution [17]. Very recently Chun et al. presented
another 2 f + 1 BFT algorithm based on similar ideas,
A2M-PBFT-EA [12]. This algorithm requires only lo-
cal tamperproof components (to implement the A2M ab-
straction) and follows a Paxos-like pattern. MinPBFT
and MinZyzzyva are also 2 f +1 BFT algorithms but that,
on the contrary the previous two, are minimal in the sev-
eral senses discussed above. They also follow a Paxos-
like pattern.
The quest for reducing the number of replicas of BFT
algorithms had other interesting developments. Yin et
al. presented a BFT algorithm for an architecture that
separates agreement (made by 3 f + 1 servers) from ser-
vice execution (made by 2 f + 1 servers) [48]. Li and
Mazieres proposed an algorithm, BFT2F, that needs 3 f +
1 replicas but if more than f but at most 2 f replicas are
faulty, the system still behaves correctly, albeit sacrific-
ing either liveness or providing only weaker consistency
guarantees [25].
Quorum systems are a way to reason about subsets of
servers (quorums) from a group. Quorums can be used
to implement data storage in which data can be written
and read. These systems are less powerful than state ma-
chine replication that is a generic solution to implement
(Byzantine) fault-tolerant systems. Martin et al. have
shown that it is possible to implement quorum-based data
storage with only 2 f +1 replicas [29].
The main quest in BFT algorithms has been for speed.
PBFT has shown that these algorithms “can be fast” [11]
but others appeared that tried to do even better. HQ com-
bined quorum algorithms with PBFT with very good per-
formance when the operations being done do not “inter-
fere” [16]. Another similar algorithm, Q/U, uses lighter,
quorum-based algorithms, but does not ensure the ter-
mination of the requests in case there is contention [1].
Very recently Zyzzyva exploits speculative execution to
reduce the number of communication steps and cryp-
tographic operations establishing a new watermark for
the performance of these algorithms [23]. An instruc-
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tive comparison of these algorithms based on simulations
was recently published [43].
Monotonic counters are a service of the TPM that ap-
peared only in version 1.2 [35, 36]. Two papers have
shown the use of these counters in very different ways
than we way we use them. Dijk et al. addressed the prob-
lem of using an untrusted server with a TPM to provide
trusted storage to a large number of clients [46]. Each
client may own and use several different devices that may
be offline at different times and may not be able to com-
municate with each other except through the untrusted
server. The challenge of this work is not to guarantee the
privacy or integrity of the clients’ data, but in guarantee-
ing the data freshness. It introduces freshness schemes
based on a monotonic counter, and shows that they can
be used to implement tamper-evident trusted storage for
a large number of users.
The TCG specifications mandate the implementation
of four monotonic counters in the TPM, but also that only
one of them can be used between reboots [35]. Sarmenta
et al. override this limitation by implementing virtual
monotonic counters on an untrusted machine with a TPM
[40]. These counters are based on a hash-tree-based
scheme and the single usable TPM monotonic counter.
These virtual counters are shown to allow the implemen-
tation of count-limited objects, e.g., encrypted keys, ar-
bitrary data, and other objects that can only be used when
the associated counter is within a certain range.
10 Conclusion
BFT algorithms typically require 3 f + 1 servers to tol-
erate f Byzantine servers, which involves considerable
costs in hardware, software and administration. There-
fore reducing the number of replicas has a very impor-
tant impact in the cost of the system. We show that using
a minimal trusted service (only a counter plus a signing
function) it is possible to reduce the number of replicas
to 2 f + 1 preserving the same properties of safety and
liveness of traditional BFT algorithms. Furthermore, we
present two BFT algorithms that are minimal, not only in
terms of number of replicas and trusted service used, but
also of communication steps in nice executions: 4 and
3 steps, respectively without and with speculation. This
is an important aspect in terms of latency, especially in
WANs. In contrast with the two previous 2 f + 1 BFT
algorithms, we were able to use the TPM as the trusted
component due to the simplicity of our USIG service.
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A CRM Correctness
CRM is correct if it satisfies the four properties stated in
Section 4:
Validity: If a correct server multicasts a message m, then
some correct server eventually accepts m.
Proof: If si is correct, then it multicasts m in a PRE-
PARE message with a valid UI (lines 1-3). At least f +1
servers are correct, verify that UI is valid for message
m and send f COMMIT messages with a valid UI to all
the other servers (lines 4-7 and 8-11). This allows some
correct server to accept m (lines 12-13).
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Agreement: if a correct server accepts a message m, then
all correct servers eventually accept m.
Proof: For a correct server to accept a message m, it
must have received f + 1 COMMIT messages (lines 12-
13), at least one of which must have been sent by a cor-
rect server. Before a correct server accepts m, it multi-
casts a COMMIT message to all servers in lines 7 or 11.
Therefore, all correct servers receive m either from the
sender (i.e., the server that executed lines 1-3) or from
another correct server and send a COMMIT message to
all others. All correct servers accept m when they get
COMMIT messages from f + 1 correct servers, which is
the minimum number of servers that are correct (lines
12-13).
Integrity: For any unique identifier UI, every correct
servers accepts at most one message m with UI, and if
sender(m) is correct then m was previously multicast by
sender(m).
Proof: This property derives trivially from the proper-
ties of the unique identifiers UI generated by the USIG
service.
Confirmability: If a correct server accepts a message m,
then it can prove that it accepted m.
Proof: A correct server accepts a message m in line
11 after receiving f + 1 COMMIT messages with a valid
UI (line 8). It can prove that it accepted m simply by
presenting a CRM-certificate composed by these f + 1
UI identifiers.
B MinPBFT Correctness
This section sketches proofs of the correctness of
MinPBFT. We have to prove that the two safety proper-
ties are always satisfied (i.e., that all servers execute the
same requests in the same order, the Agreement and To-
tal Order properties) and the same for liveness (i.e., that
it always makes progress). We divide our argument in
normal case operation and view change.
B.1 Normal case operation
In normal case operation the primary remains always the
same. For this case we need only to prove that the safety
properties are satisfied, as liveness is guaranteed by do-
ing a view change when the primary is suspected of being
faulty.
The case in which all servers are correct is simple,
since the primary uses the CRM algorithm that relies
on createUI to define the sequence number of each re-
quest it receives, and the USIG service always provides
sequential numbers in a server.
With a faulty primary, we have to prove that two differ-
ent requests never get the same sequence number. Cor-
rect servers pick the sequence number of a request from
the UI when they accept a message sent using the CRM
algorithm. The Integrity property of CRM ensures pre-
cisely that two different messages never get the same UI
identifier, thus also the same sequence number.
We also have to prove that a faulty primary can not
cause the execution of the same request twice. Every
server stores in a vector Vreq the seq of the last request
executed from each client. Therefore, if in normal case
operation it detects that CRM accepted again a sequence
number for a request already in Vreq, it does not execute
it.
B.2 View change
The main properties of the view change operation that
we have to prove are: (1) no requests executed in v are
executed in v′ > v; (2) requests received but not executed
in view v are executed in a view v′ > v; and (3) the algo-
rithm does progress. A view v′ becomes the current view
in a server when it receives a NEW-VIEW message with
a valid UI and with f +1 VIEW-CHANGE messages with
the same v′.
We first prove the first property, i.e., that no requests
executed in v are executed in v′. First, however, it is im-
portant to show that this is a problem, not trivially solved
with the seq number of the clients’ requests. Suppose
that the new view was just installed, that n = 3, that s0
was the primary in view v, that new primary for view
v + 1, s1, is faulty and that the last two requests ac-
cepted/executed in view v were seq1 and seq2 (this one
was the last). Consider also that server s2 is slow and
did not accept the request seq2 yet because it did not re-
ceive all COMMIT messages yet (allowed by our lack of
assumptions on communication delays); therefore, when
s2 multicasts the VIEW-CHANGE message it puts in Clast
the request seq1. Finally, suppose that the new primary
also puts in Clast the request seq1, not because it did not
accept the request seq2 – it did – but because it is faulty.
The new primary can prove in message NEW-VIEW that
request seq2 was not accepted in view v, while in fact it
was. Server s2 does not execute request seq2 in view v,
breaking the safety properties of the algorithm. The seq
number in clients’ requests clearly does not help here.
This problem is avoided by using the FIFO order and
Vacc to prevent processes from lying about the last re-
quest they accepted. The simplest way to explain this
is with the previous example. If s2 did not accept seq2
then s1 (new primary) must have accepted it or no server
would have accepted it (there are no other f +1 servers).
Therefore, s1 has sent a COMMIT message with a UI
identifier with a monotonic counter value, say, cv. When
it sends the VIEW-CHANGE message, it has to send an-
other UI with a monotonic counter value that must be
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cv+ 1 (due to the properties of the USIG service). On
the contrary, when it has sent the COMMIT message for
request seq1, the counter number must have been at most
cv−1. Therefore, to prevent s1 (or any other) from lying,
a correct server only considers a VIEW-CHANGE mes-
sage sent by si with a UI that contains a counter with
value cv+1, being cv the value stored in Vacc in the po-
sition for server si.
Now we prove the second property, i.e., that requests
received but not executed in view v are eventually exe-
cuted in view v′ > v. The proof resumes to noticing that
a client resends a request that is not executed before a
timeout. It the request is resent without need, it is not
executed twice due to the seq mechanism. Nevertheless,
when there is a view change the new primary tries to ex-
ecute any requests that were not executed in the previous
view, as long as it has received them.
The third property is about progress of the algorithm.
The main property that must be guaranteed is that view
changes do not go on indefinitely. A first cause for this
effect might be one or more faulty servers sending REQ-
VIEW-CHANGE messages, but f + 1 servers are needed
to force a view change, one of which must be correct.
A second cause might be long delays in the network (or
processors). To deal with this effect the timer used to
detect if the primary is faulty starts with Tvc and goes on
being multiplied by two whenever there is a view change.
Therefore, as we assume that delays do not grow indef-
initely (see Section 2), eventually a correct primary is
selected and the delays are lower than the timeout used.
C MinZyzzyva Correctness
Like in Zyzzyva, the properties ensured by MinZyzzyva
are defined in terms of histories. Each server in
MinZyzzyva maintains an ordered history of the requests
it has executed. Part of that history, up to some request,
is said to be committed, while the rest is speculative.
A prefix of the history is committed if the server has a
COMMIT-certificate to prove that a certain request was
executed with a certain sequence number. A COMMIT-
certificate is composed by f +1 matching responses from
f + 1 different servers (Zyzzyva needs 2 f + 1 but for
MinZyzzyva f +1 are enough as the sequence number is
defined by the USIG service). These certificates can be
sent by a client in the faulty server case (see Section 6) or
obtained from a set of f + 1 matching checkpoints (see
the same section). Notice that a COMMIT-certificate
does not commit the execution of only one request, with
a certain sequence number, but of all requests up to that
sequence number. The reason is immediate: the certifi-
cate contains a confirmation (i.e., a reply with a UI) from
f + 1 servers, at least one of which must be correct and
that does not execute a request without executing the pre-
vious ones.
The two properties that we have to prove about
MinZyzzyva are the same that were proved for Zyzzyva
[23]. These properties are defined from the point of view
of what is observed by a client. Informally, a request
is said to have complete if the client can use the reply
to that request, i.e., if the client can be certain that the
(speculative) execution of that request will not be rolled
back.
The properties that MinZyzzyva has to satisfy are:
Safety: If a request with sequence number seq and his-
tory hseq completes, then any request that completes with
a higher sequence number seq′ ≥ seq has a history hseq′
that includes hseq as a prefix.
Liveness: Any request issued by a correct client eventu-
ally completes.
Next we sketch a proof that MinZyzzyva satisfies these
two properties.
C.1 Safety
Consider first the case in which there are only gra-
cious executions. Clients send requests that are specu-
latively and sequentially executed by all 2 f + 1 servers,
which reply to the clients. Periodically the servers ex-
change checkpoint messages, which are used to compose
COMMIT-certificates and pass part of the history from
speculative to committed. Clearly any request that com-
pletes with a higher sequence number seq′ ≥ seq has a
history hseq′ that includes hseq as a prefix.
Now consider the case in which the client and the pri-
mary are correct but there are from 1 to f faulty servers
that do not reply to the client (if they execute the requests
or not is indifferent). A clients that sends a request, re-
ceives at least f + 1 matching replies, but not 2 f + 1,
so it sends a COMMIT-certificate to all servers, passing
part of their history from speculative to committed. As
before, the history committed by the certificate includes
the previously committed history as prefix.
A variant of this case is when the client is faulty and
does not send the COMMIT-certificate. In that situation,
the part of the history that would become confirmed if
the COMMIT-certificate was sent, remains speculative
until there is a checkpoint, something that will eventually
happen.
The case in which there is a view change is eas-
ily proved considering that this operation is similar to
MinPBFT’s. For that algorithm we proved that the view
change operation defines which was the last sequence
number for the previous view and the first sequence num-
ber of the new view. Therefore, the process of commit-
ting parts of a history is exactly as before. If, for instance,
17
a client commits the execution of a request with sequence
number seq in view v, it also commits all requests in pre-
vious views as all correct servers agree in which were the
requests executed in previous views.
It is interesting to clarify why MinZyzzyva is indeed
speculative, similarly to Zyzzyva. The reason is that
some correct servers can (speculatively) execute requests
in view v that are not considered to have been executed
when there is a view change. For example, if the pri-
mary is faulty and sends the request with the sequence
number to a backup b but not to the others, b specula-
tively executes the request but this request will not be
considered to having been executed when there is a view
change, and b will have to rollback the execution. Notice
that however the behavior of the faulty primary is much
more constrained that in Zyzzyva as the USIG will pre-
vent any other request from being executed in the same
view, causing a view change.
C.2 Liveness
The liveness property states that a request issued by a
correct client eventually completes. We consider the
same cases of the previous section. The case of a gra-
cious execution is the simplest as all servers acknowl-
edge the execution of the request and it becomes imme-
diately complete.
The case of 1 to f faulty servers (other than the
primary) requires that the client sends a COMMIT-
certificate, which it does as it is correct. This certificate
is then used by the servers to commit the history up to
that request, and the correct servers send another reply
making the request complete.
In the case the client is faulty, it may not send a
COMMIT-certificate but, as discussed above, the execu-
tion of that request will eventually become committed by
a checkpoint.
The last case is when the primary is faulty and tries to
prevent progress in some way. That problem is solved by
the view change operation, exactly as in MinPBFT.
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